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We examine the emergent field of economic networks and explore its ability to shed
light on the global and volatile economy where credit, ownership, innovation, invest-
ment, and virtually every other economic activity is carried at a scale and scope that
respects no geographical, organizational, or political boundaries. In this context, the
study of economic networks and their dynamics must reflect the vast complexity of
the interaction patterns and integrate it with a realistic account of the incentives and
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information that govern agents’ behavior. The interplay of both has been shown to pro-
duce metastabilities, system crashes, and emergent structures in ways that are yet only
poorly understood. Meeting this exciting scientific challenge requires a combination of
time-series analysis, complexity theory, and simulation with the analytical tools that
have been developed by game theory, as well as graph and matrix theories. We argue
that this will help achieving a better integration of theory and data models and provide
a better understanding of the potentials and risks of modern economic systems.
Keywords: Economic networks.
1. Motivation
The current economic crisis illustrates a critical need for new and fundamental
understandings of the structure and dynamics of economic networks. Economic sys-
tems are increasingly built on inter-dependencies of both behavior and information,
leading to a global economy where credit and investment, trade and input–output
ﬂows, research and innovation all occur at a truly world scale that gives rise to
a hugely complex system that is diﬃcult to predict and control. Moreover, some
inter-dependencies become obvious only during and after the crisis, developing as
self-fulﬁlling phenomena, without precursory signatures.
Speciﬁcally, for the current ﬁnancial crisis, the problems that have initially
emerged from thorough analyses include the (lack of) separation of banking and
investment, low ﬁnancial transparency in leveraging, or the breakdown of the nec-
essary trust. In eﬀect, these inherently include factors involving the structure and
dynamics of economic networks of all sorts: ﬁnancial (e.g. reﬂecting credit or own-
ership) and otherwise (i.e. “real” ones pertaining to production, trade, and innova-
tion). Their interplay has been argued to lead to an accumulation of excesses in the
form of bubbles, whose interaction and mutual reinforcement has led to enormous
imbalances explaining the severity of the crisis [62].
The complexity of the modern global economy is exacerbated by the speed
and scope at which information ﬂows electronically across national and glob-
ally networked markets, with variable intensity of ties and of scale. This makes
attempts to understand or control its emergent and volatile networks very dif-
ﬁcult indeed. In particular, the danger of cascading failures or the spread of
opportunistic behavior through the economic networks is greater today than ever.
Self-feeding eﬀects, reinforcing each other through a co-evolving network, can lead
to large scale and abrupt consequences that may be too hard to anticipate and
tackle.
In sum, the current crisis illustrates the importance and large potential beneﬁts
of applying a network approach to the study of the economic system. The frontiers
of research examining economic networks have been advancing along two strands:
one emanating from economics and sociology, the other from research on complex
systems in physics and computer science [55]. In both, nodes represent the diﬀer-
ent individual actors, or agents, such as ﬁrms, banks, or even countries, and links
between the nodes describe their mutual interactions, be it trade, ownership, or
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credit/debt relationships. The addition or deletion of either agents or the links
between them, and changes in the direction of links, are the fundamentals of
network formation.
In a nutshell, our proposed research program is to blend the former two strands
of research, adopting from each its strongest points. This entails extending and
integrating the traditional paradigm in economic theory (with its emphasis on
agents’ information and incentives notwithstanding its abstraction from complex-
ity) with the insights and tools developed by the booming ﬁeld of complex sys-
tems (which stresses complexity but ignores those key considerations that underlie
agents’ behavior). Building on the latter one, statistical physics already made strong
attempts to “scale the ivory towers of ﬁnance” [19]. However, the emergent ﬁeld
of econophysics [20, 40] was met by economists with quite mixed feelings [15, 23].
Thus, it needs a more substantial approach to merge economic theory with complex
systems research. Given the goals of the present discussion we brieﬂy review some
of the research in economic networks that is being undertaken along these lines,
but also brieﬂy note past impediments to needed inquiry.
2. The Complex Systems Perspective
In the complex systems approach, stochastic rules for link formation are tested
to ﬁnd the simplest assumptions that can reproduce statistical regularities in the
observed empirical network structure. These rules take into account the charac-
teristic features of the agents [1, 45], such as their connectivity degree (number of
links attached to that agent/node) or centrality (measuring the importance of a
node either through the number of shortest or random paths that pass through it
or the recursive weighting of the importance of its neighbors), and do not focus
on understanding the endogenous behavior of individual agents as strictly econom-
ically motivated agents. These models, therefore, supplement classical economic
models to identify the systemic implications of certain network-formation rules on
the emerging link structure and of that link structure as a constraint on the options
for agents.
At this point in the complex network literature, predictions are often at the
aggregate level. Structural properties of networks generated with diﬀerent stochastic
algorithms (e.g. random, scale-free, or small world networks) have been compared
with real complex networks, including those in biology (e.g. metabolic and genetic
networks), infrastructure (road networks and power grids), communication (internet
and mobile phone) and social interaction (e.g. collaborations) [5,8]. The comparison
of network structures from these diﬀerent disciplines suggests that various universal-
ity classes can be identiﬁed, e.g. based on the distribution of node degrees. For exam-
ple, in ﬁnancial contexts, the degree distribution is seen to scale as a power-law for
the connections of banks in an inter-bank network [9,29], where the fat tail indicates
that there exist few banks interacting with many others. In this example, banks
with similar investment behavior form clusters in the network. Similar regularities
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also can be traced for the international trade network (ITN) [17, 18, 24, 49, 56, 57],
albeit with some important diﬀerences. For instance, the total value of country
trade is not power-law distributed, but scales as a log-normal density [18]. This
hints to an underlying null model of uncorrelated trade ﬂows, which in turn poses
interesting questions about the purported complexity of the ITN.
Other examples are provided by the regional investment or ownership networks
[7,26], where European ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm foreign direct investment (FDI) stock is found
to be power-law distributed with the number of employees in the investing ﬁrm and
in the ﬁrm invested in, and with the number of incoming and outgoing investments
of both ﬁrms. This allows single time-point “predictions” about the investments
that regions will receive or make, based on the activity and connectivity of their
ﬁrms. Thus, ﬁrm activity and attractiveness are consonant. Temporal dynamics
would need to be studied to see how these variables alter the probability of future
activity and attraction in the short and the long run. Data models for networks
and the attributes of their nodes and links need to be speciﬁed as key elements and
relations extrapolated from appropriate raw data to create a correspondence with
theoretical variables so that theories can be tested.
Regularities observed on the aggregate level, however, like a degree distribution
that follows a power-law, do not imply a speciﬁc underlying dynamics of the agents
such as preferential attachment [1] to better-connected banks or countries, for exam-
ple. In other words, this is another example of the unconditional-object problem
in empirical validation [10]. Preferential attachment (or proportionate growth) is
just one of many generative processes for a power-law distribution [60]. Further-
more, strictly speaking, proportional growth is not suﬃcient to lead to power-laws.
Birth of novel network groups and their possible subsequent demise (death) are two
essential ingredients that provide a wealth of regimes and in particular of diﬀerent
power-laws [53]. The universality scaling properties of certain networks, such as
power-laws, thus provide only a ﬁrst-order classiﬁcation that emphasizes the role of
ﬂuctuations and randomness. We predict that the next generation of research will
be challenged to measure causality in time series and deviations from universality
and allow us to identify the idiosyncratic mechanisms associated with individual
agent dynamics and their decision-making processes. This combination should even-
tually allow us to predict and propose economic policies that favor desired network
structures such as those that show themselves more robust to economic shocks.
Oversimpliﬁcation, however, is the casualty of much prior work on universality
classes in the topology of networks. Simply put: there has been too much spurious
inference from forms of distributions to their generating functions, and without test-
ing through time-series analysis whether these are the actual time-lagged generative
processes.
3. The Socio-Economic Perspective
In contrast, the socio-economic perspective emphasizes understanding how the
strategic behavior of the interacting agents is inﬂuenced by — and reciprocally
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shapes — relatively simple changes in network architectures. Economic networks
are often viewed through the lens of a network formation game among competing
and cooperating agents. In this regard, agents include ﬁrms that collaborate in joint
R&D projects [28] or workers who share information on job opportunities [27], and
links are added or deleted as the result of purposeful decisions by individual agents
that seek to maximize their payoﬀs. Furthermore, agents must rely on some (gener-
ally imperfect and asymmetric) anticipation of what others will do with their (per-
haps limited) information about their environment, they frame the problem within
some (necessarily bounded) time horizon, and learn from past (and possibly biased)
experience of similar situations [22]. These considerations result in a dramatically
large number of options (strategies, interactions, etc.) to choose from and therefore
agents must be modeled as deciding among them on the basis of boundedly ratio-
nal rules [11, 50, 64]. Given the lack of empirical evidence for the standard rational
agent model, several alternative approaches are currently explored, some of them
claiming that agents are even “predictably irrational” with hard-wired biases and
quirks [3]. So, there may be a signiﬁcant component of “noise” or irreproducibility
captured by the concept of random utilities [43].
Analyzing economic networks of these sorts involves the use of game theory,
which aims at determining the equilibrium (i.e. strategically stable) outcomes, and
compares them with what eﬃciency would require. These problems have been typ-
ically addressed within a mathematical framework that is built on stylized simpliﬁ-
cations of the situation. In the end, this leads to focusing on the simplest topologies
(such as a star or a complete network, where everyone interacts with all others).
The task becomes increasingly diﬃcult to solve if the size of the network increases
and the topology is allowed to become more complicated.
Nevertheless, the game-theoretic approach is important to highlight the cru-
cial role of incentives in the endogenous and induced behavior of socio-economic
networks such as those of collaboration, innovation and R&D [4,31,34,35]. In par-
ticular, the competition of interests between individual incentives and aggregate
welfare need to be captured, along with their impact on the overall eﬃciency in
the network performance. This tension is well illustrated in the evidence gathered
on R&D collaboration in the innovative human biotech industry [47]. In this disas-
sortative network — the pairing of highly connected and less connected nodes —
ﬁrms in a single multi-connected (cohesive) core also connect with new innovative
organizations that are peripheral in the network. Newcomer tie formation in succes-
sive years moves them up the cohesive hierarchy composed of successively smaller
groups of ﬁrms with escalating levels of multi-connectivity. In its ﬁrst two decades,
the network has a metastable 2.5–3.5 year alternation between (a) higher levels of
cohesion as newcomers are integrated by core ﬁrms that extend their cohesive ties
in new areas of research and (b) lower levels of cohesion in periods of high recruit-
ment for novelty. As this study continues while the industry matures, it will be of
interest to see if expansion of the cohesive core outstrips recruitment for novelty
with the consequence of undermining the disassortivity that has metastabilized the
industry.
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4. Instability and Systemic Risk
The problem of network formation changes substantially if the underlying envi-
ronment is subject to persistent volatility, such as rapid innovation, socio-political
instability, or environmental change [41] and agents cannot be posited to be at
equilibrium [21]. In this context, it is natural to assume that agents follow simple
satisﬁcing rules (decision-making strategies that attempt to meet criteria for ade-
quacy, rather than to identify an optimal solution), which they may change in light
of their experiences. In such cases, agents cannot hope to attain optimal conﬁgura-
tions and, moreover, one ﬁnds that the performance of the system can be sharply
sensitive to small changes in environmental volatility.
Actually, investigations of complex systems by means of statistical physics [40]
have led to the important insight that big disruptions on the system’s level do
not need large perturbations to occur. Most networks of interest exhibit qualitative
changes of regimes in their characteristics and dynamics upon the smooth variations
of some “control” parameters or as a function of the network topology and/or met-
ric. These qualitative changes are known under a variety of names, such as ruptures,
phase transitions, bifurcations, catastrophes, and tipping points. The ubiquitous
tendency to extrapolate new behavior from past ones is fundamentally mistaken at
such phase transitions, since the new collective organization is in general completely
diﬀerent from the previous one. Novel models of networks that recognize the role of
phase transitions allow us to unify diﬀerent regimes under a synthetic framework,
sometimes with encouraging potential for prediction of crises [59]. Recognizing and
using this “phase transition-bifurcation-catastrophe-tipping point” phenomenon is
crucial to learn how to diagnose in advance the symptoms of the next great crisis,
as most crises occur under only smooth changes of some control variables, without
the need for an external shock of large magnitude.
It has been explored in diﬀerent ﬁelds — such as ecosystems or markets —
how networks that are bipartite or disassortative are thought [42] or shown [29]
to lend robustness, within certain limits, against disturbance to the system. For
example, the alternation of buyers and suppliers in production chains (avoiding
triples and forming hierarchies) also provides structural stability [44]. These types
of structures in economic networks, however, have been shown to be vulnerable to
cascades of failure: as when production chains lack redundancies, certain ranges
of ﬂow parameters lead to insolvencies [6], or problems of pricing created by non-
competitive buyers lead to instabilities [44]. Bankruptcy cascades may occur when
suppliers are not paid by those who are their suppliers, or by unexpected shocks to
revenues. Studies of local interactions and global network properties go beyond the
coupling of global averages [39], as when more ﬁrms fail, raising the interest rate
for all, causing still more to fail [6, 38].
A further level of complexity of disassortative instabilities is shown in the study
of an overnight money market [29]. Here, a disassortative network tendency is
induced by big lenders having many small borrowers, or the reverse. The dominant
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tendency is metastable (recurrent alternation without a system crash) where rever-
sals depend on whether inter-bank rates toward end-of-month short-term clearing
days are decreasing (favoring big lenders) or increasing (favoring buyers). In the loan
network this is reﬂected by changes in the indegree versus outdegree distributions,
where the dominant distribution tends to converge at month’s end to a power-law.
Thus, a macro-feature of the network (lending rates) aﬀects disassortativity and a
degree connectivity power-law emerges from the short-term behaviors of the nodes.
Metastable dynamical oscillations between these two disassortative states become
unstable, however, when overall density of the network of loans passes a critical
threshold. As shown by simulation [30] this is because disassortativity is no longer
possible and uncertainty becomes greater for both buyers and sellers.
Questions of how standing debts and claims between connected ﬁnancial insti-
tutions aﬀects the probability of a systemic failure has generated interesting
insights [2, 37]. The Lehman Brothers failure oﬀers a real-world example but to
provide a predictive theory here requires that we understand longer run dynamics.
Most theoretical and empirical methods are not suited to predict cascading network
eﬀects. The assumption that a denser network of inter-bank loans or securitization
would allow for a better diversiﬁcation of the failure risk of individual nodes is
suspect because risk is only transferred to another level. Simulation studies [6, 38]
suggest that greater aggregate risk may depend on the coupling strength between
nodes. Thus, for ﬁnancial systems, new measures of systemic risks associated with
liquidity and credit exposures will be needed to increase the robustness of the global
ﬁnancial system to idiosyncratic shocks.
Simulations that account for the addition/removal of only single agents to/from
the network at each instance of time can produce stable dynamic network models
of aggregate risk, but the addition or removal of whole groups of agents to/from
the network (e.g. as part of a systemic failure) may result in larger, less pre-
dictable eﬀects and drastically change the stability of the system. In this context,
it is important to note that networks often fragment and sub-networks coalesce
at timescales comparable with those at which epidemics or information spread.
We therefore need a unifying conceptual framework [52] to take into account the
interplay between these diﬀerent timescales of grouping, fragmentation, and trans-
mission processes. This allows to reproduce diﬀerent domain-speciﬁc empirical infec-
tion proﬁles, featuring multiple resurgences and abnormal decay times, by simply
varying the timescales for group formation and individual transmission [65]. These
results emphasize the need to account for the dynamic evolution of multi-connected
networks.
In addition, there exist global network eﬀects that are not a priori apparent from
the measurable networks of inter-loans, transfer of goods and other exchanges, but
result from inter-dependencies in decisions of economic agents. Coming back to
the example of Lehman Brothers failure, it was the announcement by the Fed-
eral Reserve that the bank will be allowed to go bankrupt, which led to a global
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ﬂight-to-safety and a freeze of inter-bank lending as all other banks realized in a
state of shock the potential cascade of defaults that was likely to result. Of course,
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers played on the underlying real network of bank
inter-dependencies, but it also suddenly activated an unrealized channel of attack
targeted to the whole system. A similar mechanism explains the surprising cascade
of defaults of a small core of Asian countries in 1997. Other countries in the region
such as South Korea or Hong Kong had strong economies that were only weakly
coupled to the epicenter of the crisis, Thailand. Yet, they were severely aﬀected
by the perception of Asian crises. It turned out that this cascade was strongly
ampliﬁed by a mechanism that is often overlooked, as analysts tend to focus on
quantitative data that are blind to it. Speciﬁcally, it was the misperception (in
behavioral economics, this would be called “framing”) by foreign investors that
the economies of geographically related countries were linked such that a weakness
in one of them was tantamount to a collective illness. The economic basis for this
belief was unfounded for South Korea and Hong Kong, yet the geographical framing
in the mind of foreign investors made the supposed links between these countries
become real: pulling out foreign investments from all these countries simultaneously
resulted in a collective and global ﬁght-to-safety; a remarkable example of a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy. This mechanism is very similar to bank runs, where just a rumor
is in principle suﬃcient to destroy even the most sound bank if everyone pulls one’s
money out at the same time. In sum, it is essential to stress and study the exis-
tence of networks of inter-dependencies that are not realized yet in the quantitative
ﬂuxes or exchanges between nodes. After all, the beliefs of human decision makers
are likely to be transmuted into acts, which may aggregate into global impacts, this
way suddenly bursting into existence. In consequence, the relevant information on
the fragility of a given network requires considering other associated explicit and
implicit networks, which need to be understood to avoid future systemic crises.
We note that the dynamics on and of networks can also develop into transient,
accelerating, self-reinforcing social bubbles. Examples are collective overenthusi-
asm as well as unreasonable investments and eﬀorts spreading in coupled networks,
which may derive through excessive public and/or political expectations of posi-
tive outcomes associated with a general reduction of risk aversion. For example, an
analysis of the Apollo program shows [25] that the economic, political, and social
factors wove a network of reinforcing feedbacks that led to widespread overenthu-
siasm and extraordinary commitment by those involved in the project as well as
by politicians and by the public at large. The development of such social bubbles
seems to be a recurrent dynamical mode appearing when several networks, such as
technological, economics, and political, become intertwined into a self-reinforcing
spiral.
5. Beyond Simplicity
The various examples given above show potential micro–macro-network linkages
where local network behavior interacts with more global network structure, i.e. in
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the exchange of knowledge, in trade, or investments. With some simpliﬁcation, the
behavioral or micro-perspective focuses on the system elements, and the global
or macro-perspective focuses on the statistical regularities observed at the system
level. A key challenge is to identify the paths through which the two largely sep-
arate strands of empirical research may converge, given that both graph theory
and complexity theory [63] contain ample evidence on the strong theoretical ties
between micro-conﬁgurations and macro-properties and structures in networks.
In addition to empirical analysis of network structure and dynamical analysis of
structural change in networks or the node and link attributes of networks, the ﬁeld of
experimental economics [12,36] provides a source of cross-validation of results to the
economic network sciences, and while this cross-fertilization has already begun [47],
we predict that these intersections will provide a rich source of stimulation for the
next generation of researchers.
The uniﬁcation of empirical studies on the grounds of basic theoretical com-
monalities may create a more uniﬁed ﬁeld of economic networks that coalesces in
a manner that advances our understanding and leads to further insight and pre-
dictions. The theorems of micro–macro-network linkages [35,63] also support closer
uniﬁcation of simulation results and empirical studies, as exempliﬁed here. This
advancements should also shed a new light on the problem of heterogeneity.
All economic networks are heterogeneous with respect to both their agents and
interaction strength, which can vary in time. Agents may have diﬀerent preferences,
access to resources, failure thresholds, and will not respond to the same inﬂuence in
the same (predictable) way. Although such variation might be thought to destabilize
a system, heterogeneity can also be a source of stability [22], as illustrated, e.g. in
decision-making diversity by prediction markets. Moreover, agent features are not
constant in time, as they are co-evolving in concert with the network structure and
are able to adapt to their environment [32].
Further, network interactions may be multi-level, elements of a given type may
be multi-scale, and the types of elements may be multiple, i.e. multi-mode, as with
two-mode memberships of agents in organizations. Most models, both in the ﬁeld
of strategic interaction and complex network approaches, ignore these variations.
Moreover, in general, “links” are not just binary (they either exist or not),
but are weighted according to the economic interaction under consideration and
represent traded volumes, invested capital, etc. and their weight can change over
time. Distinguishing networks at diﬀerent levels of abstraction, e.g. considering
directed or undirected, weighted or unweighted links, may illuminate the evolution
of their topological properties.
Indeed, ﬁndings from study of the ITN [18] emphasize how the topological prop-
erties of the network viewed as a binary graph, where only the presence/absence of a
trade relation is accounted for, are very diﬀerent from their weighted counterparts.
For example, in the binary ITN, countries with many trade partners typically trade
with partners that hold few trade relations, leading to a strongly disassortative
network. Conversely, when links are weighted by the value of trade actually ﬂowing
through them in a given time interval, say one year, one ﬁnds that countries holding
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very strong trade relationships typically trade with many countries, but very inten-
sively with only a few very-connected of them.
Weighting of ties also gives a better sense of how strength of integration in
the network diﬀerentiates and reﬂects the patterns of economic growth in diﬀerent
regions. Comparison of high-performing Asian economies (HPAE) with Latin Amer-
ican (LATAM) economies shows very similar trade patterns over the eight ﬁve-year
periods from 1970 to 2005 when measured by amount of trade or trade relative
to GDP, that is, by the aggregate trade attributes of the countries. A country’s
global centrality in the ITN could be measured by accounting for the likelihood
that a given dollar passing from country X to Y through links in the network with
a probability proportional to their weight (i.e. the value of bilateral trade ﬂowing
through the link in a year) passes through country Z, increasing its betweenness
score [46]. As described in Refs. 49 and 54, the Asian Tigers have been climbing
the ranking of betweenness centrality, whereas LATAM ones remained persistently
out of the club of the most central world countries. These results hold when link
weights for trade are scaled by importer and/or exporter GDP, i.e. when one washes
away country-size supply or demand eﬀects. This removes the correlation of link
weights with GDP, but the diﬀerentiation between Asian and LATAM countries
still holds. Thus, network-based approaches provide a means by which to moni-
tor complex economics systems, and may provide better control in managing and
governing these systems.
6. Novel Ways of Data Analysis
Knowledge of how systems of connections work will rely on our ability to obtain
more and better data, fostering the transition of the ﬁeld of economics networks
from a qualitative to a quantitative and evidence-based science. As computational
power increases, it allows large-scale network data on diﬀerent levels of the economy
(e.g. ﬁrms, industries, and countries) to be gathered as well as testing of models
reﬂecting the generation of large synthetic data sets. In fact, new means by which
business data and internet communication are processed allow for analysis of data
soon to be or already available. This includes detailed panel data (longitudinal or
cross-sectional time series data) on speciﬁc ﬁrm interactions (employee ﬂows, R&D
collaborations, etc.) or ﬁrm-bank credit market interactions.
The ability to process large data streams will require new tools to squeeze out
every last drop of available information reﬂecting agent interactions and network
properties (instead of deriving them from theoretical approaches). Such databases,
therefore, may complement both economic network experiments and empirical
economic network studies [33, 44, 47] by allowing large-scale observations in real
time [14, 61]. Studying the relaxation dynamics of a social or economic system
after endogenous and exogenous bursts of activity may reveal internal structures
of network organization. It also poses the challenge of generalizing in such out-
of-equilibrium contexts the ﬂuctuation-susceptibility theorem, which has been so
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powerful for accessing the inner properties of complex physical systems at or close
to equilibrium [51]. Encouraging results oﬀer a classiﬁcation of the viral nature of
information spreading on social networks [13].
Another very promising line of empirical research and data analysis involves
comparing insights obtained by studying the topological properties of diﬀerent,
albeit strongly related, economic networks. A comparison of the topological prop-
erties of the ITN and IFN, using the betweenness measure [46] shows that goods
markets are more densely connected than ﬁnancial ones, but both networks display
a disassortative, star-shaped structure dominated by a handful of hubs, i.e. very
connected countries that in turn interact with weakly disconnected ones. These
hubs form a rich club in each network, which are characterized by strong links and
can be thought of as the core of each network. This hierarchical structure is more
marked in IFN than in the ITN, a feature that can be explained in terms of the
existence of economies of scale and scope in the processing of information inherent
to ﬁnancial intermediation. Economies at such scale lead to the emergence of large
ﬁnancial centers that oﬀer a more eﬃcient intermediation and therefore attract
many partners. Moreover, their high-income countries tend to be more integrated
and more clustered [54]. Hence, they act as hubs for poorer economies, so that a
hierarchy exists also in terms of economic development.
Economic networks, as other real-world systems, also evolve in physical space as
well as time. The transmission of information or the adoption of a new states and
physical distances for interaction, such as trade, occurs over natural timescales. This
challenges both theoretical concepts and use of raw data for empirical validation
purposes. Borrowing from theoretical and applied work in social sciences, one might
map real-world constraints of time and space in manners that may be advantageous
to scientiﬁc advances.
Time-dependent resolution of the properties of economic networks moves beyond
a single-snapshot approach, and allows the researcher to identify conditions for
dynamical or path-dependent evolution of networks by combining ﬁndings with
complementary information, i.e. the correlations between economic network evolu-
tion and other macro-economic dynamics. Most previous studies of networks are
based on the assumption that networks are more permanent than they really are.
For example, the longitudinal analysis of human biotechnology [47] suggests that
there is a life cycle of research and development networks related to the timing of
the exchange of knowledge. As pointed out above, explaining the existence of many
coexisting timescales associated with the evolution of networks and their relevance
in the dynamics occurring on them is crucial.
Extracting network structure from reported data, in particular for aggregated
economic data, is very diﬃcult. For example, the banking sector does not make all
debt/credit relationships publicly available although theoretical decompositions of
aggregated data have been studied [9]. Even then, analyses may resemble reading
tea leaves: only what was previously known or predicted is revealed. Statistical reg-
ularities in economic networks have been identiﬁed through sheer data processing,
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but challenges the importance of the various measures that are input in large-scale
network characterization. Thus, the utility of each measure needs to be critically
examined.
Speciﬁcally, information about the role of agents and their function or their
inﬂuence in an evolving economic network needs to be extracted [48, 58]. Given
that measures such as multi-connective cohesion are useful indicators [47] related
to causal processes, one might handle their computational complexity through cloud
computing and use of supercomputers, or look to matrix-based methods that focus
on cycle density in networks such as sub-group centrality [16].
New methods are needed to identify patterns and new concepts to quantify
control (direct and indirect) need to be developed. Promising steps have already
been taken, as demonstrated by the identiﬁcation of the backbone of control in
ownership networks [26] and roles deﬁned by structural position [48] or centrality
rankings [49] in the ITN.
7. Conclusions
The network approach brings a whole new perspective on the role of co-evolving
inter-dependency in large and complex economic systems. We anticipate that a
new wave of research should begin to merge the description of individual agent’s
strategies with their co-evolving networks of interactions, in ways that are enriched
by insights discovered from simulation [35]. There is much more to discover from
approaches combining the economic emphasis of individual strategic decisions with
a network approach of interactions and adaptive feedbacks. Sometimes, such meth-
ods may lead to single equilibria, but more often they result in multiple coexisting
equilibria, regime shifts and out-of-equilibrium transients, as well as sudden bifur-
cations to new regimes which more accurately characterize real-world systems.
In this way, we should obtain new perspectives on the principles that make
economic networks robust and eﬃcient in the face of network complexity. Causal
analysis of time series will be needed if better policies, e.g. both to reduce conﬂicts
between individual interests and the risk of global failure, can be designed. Net-
work simulations of the dynamics of innovation involving transfer and growth of
knowledge shows that network formation is ineﬃcient if the time to evaluate new
links is too short [34, 35], which matches ﬁndings about time-lags for assimilating
new knowledge and innovation in knowledge industries [47].
A rich research agenda in economic networks is being built upon the foundation
of self-organization resulting from the interplay between agents’ decision making
and the dynamic interactions among them. However, we argue that to maximize
the information from such studies three complementary lines of research must be
pursued: (a) empirical studies providing insights into economic networks from mas-
sive data analysis, (b) theory encompassing the appropriate description of economic
agents (heterogeneity, strategic interaction) and their interactions (network dynam-
ics, time boundedness, co-evolution of agents and interactions), and (c) a systemic
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perspective bestowing a new understanding of systemic eﬀects as coming from vary-
ing network interactions.
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